However, Wahid also made it clear that he did not favor outright independence for West Papua/Irian Jaya. In the months following Wahid's election, the Morning Star flag was freely raised and preparations were made for a Papuan People's Congress which would serve as a clearing-house for Papuan concerns, grievances, and proposals. On December 1, 1999 Papuans held a rally announcing the anniversary of the declaration of West Papuan independence, first 'achieved" on December 1, 1961. Although flag-raisings were permitted on the day of the rally, and violence was avoided, the following day witnessed a number of deadly clashes between independence supporters and the Indonesian military.

In overcoming possibility the separatist group take the momentum to provoke other Papuans, The central government to make proposal The Special Autonomy for Papua. The question of autonomy was first officially broached after Suharto's resignation, as pressures were quickly mounting on the newly appointed Habibe. Hoping to assuage growing resentment and facilitate the decentralization process, Habibe presented two proposals to the MPR. These laws, passed in April 1999, created an important division of powers between the central and regional authorities. Defense, foreign affairs, religion, the administration of justice and monetary and fiscal policy remained core duties of the central government, while public services such as education, health care and infrastructure now fell under regional control. A previously existing hierarchical relationship between the provinces was also eliminated. Under the new laws, provinces would receive a significantly larger portion of the central government's revenues, including 15% of onshore oil revenues, 30% of onshore gas revenues, roughly 80% of mining and forestry revenues, 20% of local income-tax receipts and about 25% of a special fund of centrally collected revenue.

The nomenclature of the process involves the offer of "regional autonomy" to all provinces, as described above, and "special autonomy" to the more unstable regions of West Papua/Irian Jaya and Aceh. Although the definition of "special autonomy" in this context is still somewhat unclear, the offer includes the economic benefits of the regional plans, as well as greater political independence and control. However, the central government's offer prohibits a referendum on independence, insisting that while moderate autonomous growth may be permissible; this will in no way jeopardize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Indonesian state.

The Papuan bill for special autonomy, proposed in April 2001, has 76 clauses outlining West Papua's demands that would ultimately end its formal wishes for independence and bring West Papua much fuller and more substantive control over its domestic affairs.

Some of the bill's contents include the following:

• Any "indigenous" Papuan inhabitant must have at least one Papuan parent
• Special autonomy applies to the indivisible province of Papua, as opposed to local regencies as usually applied under regional autonomy laws
• Papuan provincial parliament will consist of two chambers with an upper house of indigenous officials and a lower house for political representatives
• A Papuan flag, symbol, and anthem
• Papua to have all governmental powers except international political relations, external defense, monetary policy, and the supreme court
• Papua to have its own police force
• Papuan provincial government to control all taxation resources, with 20% of the revenue to go to the central government
• The creation of a human rights court
• The granting of a right to compensation for all victims of past human rights abuses
• A guarantee of religious freedom
• The ending of transmigration policies
• The Papuan right to self-determination if a special historical commission decides that    the annexation of ,Papua into Indonesia is illegal under international law
  

The bill was passed by the Indonesian parliament on October 22, 2001. In its final form, it gives West Papua 70 percent of royalties from mining and 80 percent from logging and fishing. Additionally, the law grants the province its own flag and anthem and changes the name of the province from Irian Jaya to Papua. The bill is scheduled to enter into effect on December 22, 2001 during a visit by Megawati to the province.

Shortly after becoming president in July 2001, Megawati Sukarnoputri assigned the newly appointed vice-president Hamzah Haz the role of implementing special autonomy in West Papua. The new administration has consistently stated that independence is not an option.

There were high hopes within the government that the special autonomy bill on October 22, 2001, would quell support for the separatist movement in West Papua. However, the pro-independence Papuan Presidium Council (PDP) immediately rejected the bill, saying that the Papuan people had not been sufficiently involved in the process and that it failed to address past human rights abuses. Nonetheless, many felt that the bill would still be received positively by many in West Papua.

It should be understood that the problems and causes of the conflict in Papua are, to a great extent, the consequence of a web of events from earlier regimes. Unfortunately, in the shifts and turns of the causes of the conflict and efforts to resolve the conflict, later regimes have tended to pursue policies and adopt measures in political and legal affairs that are transitional and ad hoc in nature, that are inconsistent and have failed to show any appreciation of the wishes of the Papuan people. At the same time, Papuan leaders, including those within the state institutions as well as in civil society do not enjoy the necessary bargaining power to be able to strategically influence the forms and direction of the policies pursued in Jakarta. The political atmosphere has been dominated by unhealthy relations between Indonesian nationalists who promote the idea of ‘NKRI is death value’ *NKRI, Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is immutable’+ while Papuan nationalists also insist that ‘Papua Merdeka’ or ‘Free Papua’ is immutable. As a result, efforts and resources in Jakarta as well as in Papua have been wasted in pursuit of political measures that are reactionary in nature. This has led to fears that the government is prepared to use military force, rather than to solve conflicts through dialogue and negotiation.

Through dialogue and negotiation without involve third party (foreign party), the central government can sit together with all stake holders and Papuan to discuss and find the better way to solve  the issue of Papua. If the Papua issue can be properly resolved, the central government and Papuan leadership will be able to prepare three peace agendas to get to the root of the conflict in Papua.

First, Papua's development can be accelerated based on a new special autonomy paradigm that prioritizes the empowerment of indigenous Papuans in the social economy, health and education sectors. Conflicts over natural resources should be resolved based on the principles of justice and benefit to local communities.

Spending on the Papuan bureaucracy should be reduced and priority given to community development spending. Parallel to this, corruption cases, such as that involving the Jayawijaya regent, should be brought to trial.

Second, human rights should be upheld while at the same time putting an end to the impunity enjoyed by the military and police. As a start, the Abepura case should be appeared. The files on the Wamena and Wasior cases should also be improved and delivered to the court for trial without delay. The entire legal process and control over prosecutors and judges should be tightened to prevent outside intervention on behalf of defendants.

Third, the question of "straightening out Papuan history", the territorial integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and reconciliation should be addressed by opening a dialog between Jakarta and Papua. This should be aimed at reaching a compromise between the "nationalist" and "separatist" poles.

In this regard, all the important elements of Papuan society should be represented, covering the grassroots like the Papuan Tribal Council, the Presidium of Papuan Councils and Churches and official leaders in Papua. The President should appoint a committee made up of members knowledgeable about Papuan affairs and experienced in negotiating. In the context of the internationalization of Papua, the government should realize that the best diplomacy would be improved Jakarta-Papua relations based upon concrete action in line with the three agendas described above and mutual trust so that have commitment to improve special autonomy in west papua.

Clifton/PT, July 22 2010